Activity theory, a concept defined by Alexey Leont'ev, presupposes that through engaging with their environment, humans create production tools that are exteriorized forms of mental processes. In my previous blog I was defining cognitivism as a tool which abstracts away information-processings itself (Leont'ev would be proud).
The question is, although cognitivism seems reasonable for allopoietic systems which have as a goal the production and transformation of information, can it still be reasonable in autopoietic systems, where information is not predefined as a valuable product, but its value comes through the valence it has for the system itself? Put in a simpler way, a computer is an allopoietic system, it is created to store, process, retrieve, present information to it's user. But the information is not the computer itself. In a human mind, there is no necessary bonus for acquiring random information, we have to dictate and decide ourselves what information is important enough to be worth attention and resources, and that information changes the structure of our future enquiries. Also the context of various pieces of information might change the meaning of the information itself - and it's meaning that we are interested in, not information-production and manipulation. Information production and manipulation is just a second-order goal to that of understanding and defending and ultimately surviving and accomplishing other goals. Information acquiring can be a purpose in itself for curious natures, but even then the curiosity of the system is biased in certain directions that are specific for it, and the nature of the receiving neural networks, their previous informational content and preoccupation will bias the meaning that is gathered in abstract pursuits.
Still, if we abstracted away the tool of information processing in cognitivism, there is a good chance that that is what we do in our heads, even if it isn't our primary goal. And if information-processing is partially what we do, we must ask ourselves what is the impact that the context and meaning of the information that we process has on the information-processing? It's impact might change a few details in the information-processing activity, but it might also move our cognitive house in a completely different realm of existence. It might mean that we fail to understand the most important things, while we do understand some details that are not as fully relevant for knowledge formation. Until we determine exactly the importance that the meaning and the context of the information presented to us has on the information-processing, we can't say to know much about how cognitive processes work in a human brain.
If we are to talk about partial truths of human cognition, there is also connectionism. What I always enjoyed in connectionism is it's focus on emergence. Connectionism says - yes, there is information processing, but what emerges beyond the activity of small units that do this information processing transcends in some way the processing. If connectionism would study more how the temporality or the succession of information that runs through a system influences the result of the processing, the philosopher of mind in me would be interested to see the results. We have yet to build more complex connectionist architectures that monitor context and are not there just to fulfil a predetermined simple computational task.
In short, if connectionism would become less computational and more oriented on monitoring systems and the encoding and interaction of larger spaces of knowledge, I think we might find results that are more realistic and in tune with human cognition.
That is to say I don't think we need to model human cognition perfectly in our artificial neural networks, but we need to model more complex neural networks and interactions between them, and switch our focus to that level of processing.
Copyright - Ana-Maria Olteteanu 2011
Sunday 2 January 2011
What happened to our cognitivism? (I)
Cognitivism started it's life with a very basic, elegant assumption - that our brain might do exactly what a computer does - process information in the form of representations. As it usually happens with elegant assumptions due to the fact that they are easy to keep in mind, use and apply, the hypothesis picked up. Still the faults started showing soon - the new mind as a processing-information machine metaphor could not explain some very important things: consciousness, phenomenology, meaning.
It seems to me that in the future, postcognitivism might look back at older disciplines like semiotics and hermeneutics, or not-so-old ones, like communication studies, and borrow in some of their metaphors and objects of study to fully mature itself.
What are the crevices and to-be-patched zones of cognitivism?
First of all, argue post-cognitivists, there is context to be taken into account in whatever information-processing matter. We can't speak of information-processing without considering the effect that the information has on the system, as the system might not encode information at all, but meaning. The exact difference between humans and machines, no matter how performant they are at information processing, lays here - information makes a difference to humans, but not to machines. If information is irrelevant for a human being, it fails to excite interest therefore gather attention and other resources needed to be processed.
We should look at information-processing the right way around, which is we created information-processing machines by abstracting a feature that the human mind has away from the human body - rather how we created robotic arms through abstracting away from the mechanics and functionality of the human arm. That doesn't mean that robotic arms can explain all the functions of the human arm.
Still, it's easier to analyse the things and features that we abstracted away, by the simple fact that we can look at them, observe them, talk about them with greater ease - as we are detached from them. And sometimes these objects are a useful source of backwards reflection and analogy, however we should avoid falling in the trap of considering them all explanatory for
all human thinking.
In human thinking, the process of information processing is called upon mostly because the information is relevant in some way. There is lots of previous information in the system, which colors the new processing, or even the questions that are enquired, the direction of the processing itself. And even partial results might invoke massive changes in the brain's state, as a result of the meaning that possible interpretations might have for the system.
Then there is the inherent problem of the basic cell that information processing is performed upon: the representation. Representations, unlike cells in biology, are a theoretical construct, and a slippery one at that. They take the role of more complex symbols upon which actions are to be performed. But unlike computer memory, the human memory is not that keen in making very detailed representations, carrying them around and manipulating them. Rather the human brain is particularly good at carrying around smaller cognitive loads, and using them in a flexible manner, more appropriate for online requests upon a cognitive processing system.
Representationalism and the idea that there is such a thing as representation came to the fore to complete the analogy of information processing - which must happen on something.
The question of imperfect representation calls to the fore the reality of what human representation might be like. If it is based on meaning, experience and continuous reconstruction of perception according to possible or previously encountered species of meaning and experience, then representation becomes a rather very biased tool.
Considering what it has been said before, it striking that cognitivism wants to talk about perfect cognition in a sense that is not necessarily true for humans, but might only be true to machines.
So if we would consider the principles of cognitivism as being part of an attempt to abstract away perfect cognitive principles and perhaps instantiate them in thinking machines, cognitivism would seem to hit the mark more, rather then with explaining to us human cognition.
But it gets better, in a sense that our perfect view of cognition as information-processing might not be that efficient after all.
A detailed description of that on the next post.
Copyright - Ana-Maria Olteteanu 2011
It seems to me that in the future, postcognitivism might look back at older disciplines like semiotics and hermeneutics, or not-so-old ones, like communication studies, and borrow in some of their metaphors and objects of study to fully mature itself.
What are the crevices and to-be-patched zones of cognitivism?
First of all, argue post-cognitivists, there is context to be taken into account in whatever information-processing matter. We can't speak of information-processing without considering the effect that the information has on the system, as the system might not encode information at all, but meaning. The exact difference between humans and machines, no matter how performant they are at information processing, lays here - information makes a difference to humans, but not to machines. If information is irrelevant for a human being, it fails to excite interest therefore gather attention and other resources needed to be processed.
We should look at information-processing the right way around, which is we created information-processing machines by abstracting a feature that the human mind has away from the human body - rather how we created robotic arms through abstracting away from the mechanics and functionality of the human arm. That doesn't mean that robotic arms can explain all the functions of the human arm.
Still, it's easier to analyse the things and features that we abstracted away, by the simple fact that we can look at them, observe them, talk about them with greater ease - as we are detached from them. And sometimes these objects are a useful source of backwards reflection and analogy, however we should avoid falling in the trap of considering them all explanatory for
all human thinking.
In human thinking, the process of information processing is called upon mostly because the information is relevant in some way. There is lots of previous information in the system, which colors the new processing, or even the questions that are enquired, the direction of the processing itself. And even partial results might invoke massive changes in the brain's state, as a result of the meaning that possible interpretations might have for the system.
Then there is the inherent problem of the basic cell that information processing is performed upon: the representation. Representations, unlike cells in biology, are a theoretical construct, and a slippery one at that. They take the role of more complex symbols upon which actions are to be performed. But unlike computer memory, the human memory is not that keen in making very detailed representations, carrying them around and manipulating them. Rather the human brain is particularly good at carrying around smaller cognitive loads, and using them in a flexible manner, more appropriate for online requests upon a cognitive processing system.
Representationalism and the idea that there is such a thing as representation came to the fore to complete the analogy of information processing - which must happen on something.
The question of imperfect representation calls to the fore the reality of what human representation might be like. If it is based on meaning, experience and continuous reconstruction of perception according to possible or previously encountered species of meaning and experience, then representation becomes a rather very biased tool.
Considering what it has been said before, it striking that cognitivism wants to talk about perfect cognition in a sense that is not necessarily true for humans, but might only be true to machines.
So if we would consider the principles of cognitivism as being part of an attempt to abstract away perfect cognitive principles and perhaps instantiate them in thinking machines, cognitivism would seem to hit the mark more, rather then with explaining to us human cognition.
But it gets better, in a sense that our perfect view of cognition as information-processing might not be that efficient after all.
A detailed description of that on the next post.
Copyright - Ana-Maria Olteteanu 2011
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